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Anyone who cares about the moral and social implications of
genomics, genetic engineering and biotechnology should
read Michael J. Sandel’s article, ‘The Case Against Perfec-
tion’, in the April 2004 issue of The Atlantic Monthly.
Sandel, the Anne T. and Robert M. Bass Professor of Gov-
ernment at Harvard University (where he teaches moral phi-
losophy), is one of the deepest thinkers of this generation.
He is a member of The President’s Council on Bioethics,
which George W. Bush established to make recommenda-
tions concerning stem-cell research, among other issues. In
this essay, with characteristically clear and penetrating
analysis, he argues that “the genomic revolution has induced
a kind of moral vertigo”, and that we are right to be troubled
by such issues as human cloning and genetic engineering for
improved human characteristics and performance. He dis-
sects four examples of the use of our new-found power of
biotechnology: muscle enhancement; memory enhance-
ment; growth-hormone treatment; and reproductive tech-
nologies that allow parents to choose the sex and some
genetic traits of their children. In each case, he concludes
that such use is morally objectionable. 
Strong words, but he defends them with tight logic and a
thorough examination of the history and purpose of the
technology. His grasp of the science is sound, and he
manages for the most part to skirt the use of religious princi-
ples, which he acknowledges vary from religion to religion
(and even within religions - consider the views of funda-
mentalist Christians versus those of more ‘moderate’
Protestants on the subject of abortion), relying instead on
pitting what he terms “the ethic of willfulness and the
biotechnological powers it has spawned” against “the ethic
of giftedness”. Sandel specializes in finding the inconsis-
tency in moral and ethical arguments and positions - a tactic
he uses here to dismiss such familiar grounds as fairness as a
basis for prohibiting certain uses of biotechnology - and he
makes instead a case that the drive to master nature, includ-
ing human nature, and to perfect it through the use of tech-
nology undermines an appreciation of the gifted - and,
therefore, imperfect - character of human powers and
achievements, and prompts us to recognize that not everything
in the world is open to whatever use we may desire or devise. 
To give you a sense of the flavor of his argument and the
elegance of his analysis, I’ll quote two passages at length.
Concerning muscle enhancement through the use of gene
therapy, he writes: “It might be argued that a genetically
enhanced athlete, like a drug-enhanced one, would have an
unfair advantage over his unenhanced competitors. But the
fairness argument against enhancement has a fatal flaw: it
has always been the case that some athletes are better
endowed genetically than others, and yet we do not consider
this to undermine the fairness of competitive sports. From
the standpoint of fairness, enhanced genetic differences
would be no worse than natural ones, assuming they were
safe and made available to all. If genetic enhancement in
sports is morally objectionable, it must be for reasons other
than fairness.”
Later, discussing reproductive technologies, he states:
“Some see a clear line between genetic enhancement and
other ways that people seek improvement in their children
and themselves. Genetic manipulation seems somehow
worse - more intrusive, more sinister - than other ways of
enhancing performance and seeking success. But, morally
speaking, the difference is less significant than it seems. Bio-
engineering gives us reason to question the low-tech, high-
pressure child-rearing practices we commonly accept. The
hyperparenting familiar in our time represents an anxious
excess of mastery and dominion that misses the sense of life
as a gift. This draws it disturbingly close to eugenics… Was
the old eugenics objectionable only insofar as it was coer-
cive? Or is there something inherently wrong with the
resolve to deliberately design our progeny’s traits… But
removing coercion does not vindicate eugenics. The problem
with eugenics and genetic engineering is that they represent
a one-sided triumph of willfulness over giftedness, of domin-
ion over reverence, of molding over beholding.” All very closely reasoned, yet something in it makes me
uneasy. Part of my uneasiness stems from the inherent sub-
jectivity of any purely moral argument. Sandel doesn’t just
assume, though, that giftedness is a better ethic than willful-
ness, he tries to prove it by showing that willful transforma-
tion of human characteristics through biotechnology would
erode three key features of our moral landscape: humility; a
sense of being only partial responsible for our talents and
performance; and solidarity. Yet I don’t think the examples
he gives succeed in establishing that these virtues are better
than the alternatives (hubris, expectations of responsibility
that cannot be met in practice, and selfishness). In the end,
he takes it for granted that we will share his belief that they
are. I happen to feel that way, so this leap of faith didn’t
really bother me that much. What did trouble me was a
sense that something important was missing. 
What that is can best be understood in light of Sandel’s
linking of genetic engineering with eugenics. Few ideas are
apt to provoke as much moral outrage as efforts to improve
humanity through selective breeding. But the history of
eugenics is more complex than its treatment in this essay,
which focuses on the coercive eugenics of the Nazi regime
and the rising market for eggs and sperm from preselected
donors. And that history is instructive. Eugenics, as defined
by the American Bioethics Advisory Commission, is the
study of methods to improve the human race by controlling
reproduction. The word was coined in 1883 by Francis
Galton, a cousin of Charles Darwin. Galton believed that
social differences reflected differences in innate endowment,
and that misguided charity encouraged the ‘unfit’ to bear
more children, which upset the mechanism of natural selec-
tion - a mechanism that, left to operate properly, would lead
to the continual improvement of the human race. He there-
fore sought to encourage the “most fit” - that is, members of
the middle and, especially, upper classes - to bear more chil-
dren, a process he likened to “artificial selection” and which
he called “eugenics” (Greek for good birth). Galton’s follow-
ers included George Bernard Shaw and Julian Huxley in
England, and Ralph Waldo Emerson and President
Theodore Roosevelt in the United States. 
Eugenics for Galton was a positive process: nothing was to
be done to stop the lower classes from procreating; rather,
the birth rate of the upper classes was to be increased. As the
idea spread, however, it became transformed. The eugenics
movements in the United States, Germany, and Scandinavia
soon favored ‘negative eugenics’, which advocated prevent-
ing the least able from breeding - in some cases through
enforced sterilization. Lest anyone think that such notions
have been permanently consigned to the garbage heap of
history where they belong, in 1995 China passed a law that
states, in part, “Physicians shall, after performing the pre-
marital physical check-up, explain and give medical advice
to both the male and the female who have been diagnosed
with certain genetic disease of a serious nature which is
considered to be inappropriate for child-bearing from a
medical point of view; the two may be married only if both
sides agree to take long-term contraceptive measures or to
take ligation operation for sterility.” A BBC survey in 1993
found that 91% of Chinese geneticists believed that couples
who carried the same disease-causing genetic mutation
should not be allowed to have children. More than three-
quarters also believed that governments should require pre-
marital tests to detect carriers of hereditary disease, and
even supported the routine genetic testing of job applicants
by employers. There was also strong backing for the genetic
testing of children to see if they are susceptible to problems
such as alcoholism.
So, Sandel may be right to raise the spectre of eugenics in the
era of the genomics revolution. But for me, the most inter-
esting thing about the history of eugenics is its connection
with Darwinism. Not only were Galton and Darwin blood
relatives, it was Darwin’s theory of “natural selection” (not, it
should be noted, “survival of the fittest” - that phrase, which
Darwin never used, was coined later by psychologist Herbert
Spencer) that led Galton to suggest that the high birth rate
among the lower classes was interfering with the normal
process of human evolution. Is it even possible to interfere
with the normal evolutionary process? And if so, haven’t we
already done so? Evolution: that, I think, is what’s missing
from Sandel’s argument. The most important single word in
modern biology occurs exactly twice in the essay, in a discus-
sion of a quote from biologist Robert Sinsheimer: “We can
be the agent of transition to a whole new pitch of evolution.”
Sandel agrees that “it may even be the case that the lure of
that vision played a part in summoning the genomic age into
being… But that promise of mastery is flawed. It threatens to
banish our appreciation of life as a gift, and to leave us with
nothing to affirm or behold outside our own will.” But he
never challenges, or discusses at all, the assumption that we
can now affect our own evolutionary changes, or asks
whether there are scientific, as opposed to moral, reasons
why we should or should not do so. 
I think there are. At least two scientific arguments could be
made in favor of the notion that we should consider inter-
vening in our own evolution. One is that, because of techno-
logical progress, evolution has effectively stopped for Homo
sapiens, and because that is a bad thing, biologically speak-
ing, we must undertake to continue it ourselves. The other is
that we have already been interfering with our own evolu-
tion, unwittingly, for at least a century, and in order to
correct the damage we’ve done and avoid further damage,
we need to intervene deliberately now. The first argument is
an old one. It’s based on the assumption that what governs
much of the evolutionary process is the fitness of the individ-
ual for the environment - ‘environment’, in this case,
meaning predominantly the climate and infectious diseases.
According to this viewpoint, our technology now largely
insulates us from the effects of climate, and antibiotics plus
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as an agent of evolutionary change, at least in the developed
world. Thus, human evolution, in a biological sense, has
ceased. Since evolution is what keeps a species from stagna-
tion and eventual decay, it is imperative that we now take
charge of continuing the process artificially as best we can. 
I’m not sure I buy the underlying assumptions. Global
warming, for example, may represent a level of climate
change to which our technology cannot make us immune.
And infectious disease appears to be making a comeback all
over the world, driven by a mobile, increased human popula-
tion and the spread of resistance. Besides, I can think of
many organisms that don’t appear to have changed much in
millions of years, and they seem to be doing just fine now -
the crocodile and the mosquito, for example. But even if we
grant all the assumptions, there is no objective evidence
about the cessation of human evolution. Genomics, I think,
is ideally poised to provide such evidence. DNA samples
from Homo sapiens over the past two centuries can be gath-
ered and analyzed. Comparative genomics and proteomics
with our closest primate relatives should also be informative
in this regard. How fast, genetically speaking, did the human
race evolve over the past 10 million years or so, and has that
rate changed? Definitive conclusions may be hard to come
by, but any data will be better than what we have now, which
is simply speculation.
The second argument, that modern medicine and changes in
our social structures have already interfered with the normal
course of evolution, is close to Galton’s original hypothesis,
which as far as I know has never been scientifically tested. It
has several new flips now, though. For example, we could
argue that improvements in human nutrition and economic
prosperity have combined to increase not only the average
height but also the average weight of the human population.
Epidemic obesity is clearly bad for society, but what about
the homogenization of other characteristics like height? We
assume everyone getting taller is better, but how do we
know? The same genome-driven scientific studies referred to
earlier should shed light on these questions. Evolutionary
biologists can contribute too, especially to a general discus-
sion of just what hybrid vigor really means. 
It’s not obvious to me in any case, even if one of these two
arguments turns out to have a factual basis, that it necessar-
ily follows that we should manipulate our characteristics so
as to restart, or restore, the process of evolution in Homo
sapiens. Implicit in that conclusion is that we would know
what we were doing, that any such deliberate tinkering
would benefit our species in an evolutionary sense. I am not
convinced that we understand the mechanisms and work-
ings of evolution well enough to do that safely - but again,
that is something about which only evolutionary biologists
can speak with any authority. Sandel’s thesis, for all its per-
suasiveness, does not let them speak. 
Moral arguments are an important part of this whole discus-
sion, of course, but sometimes they leave no place for scientists
to weigh in as scientists, to offer evidence on what the facts
are and whether those facts suggest certain courses of action
to be desirable or undesirable. If the human race is indeed
about to engage in a great debate about how - or in some
cases whether at all - our new powers of biology are to be
used on ourselves, then I think it is imperative that biologists
provide a candid and objective assessment of what the avail-
able data tell us about human evolution. Ultimately, the deci-
sions that follow from this debate must be made by humanity
in general, and it may be that moral arguments will - and
perhaps should - carry the day. Or perhaps the romantic
vision of the quest for perfection, however unattainable, will
prove to be irresistible. I don’t know how all this will turn out
in the end. But I do know that the discussion should not be
undertaken in the absence of the information that only we
can provide. Besides, our unique abilities as a species to inte-
grate both objective and subjective factors into our course of
action; to ask and try to answer questions that have both
moral implications and factual issues; and to be skeptical and
adventurous at the same time - aren’t those gifts too?
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